OPERATIONS  UPON  THE  SEA 


OPERATIONS   UPON 
THE  SEA 


A  STUDY 


/'    r  ^  V)  J. 

BY 

FREIHERR  von  EDELSHEIM 

In  the  Service  of  the  German  General 
Staff  in  1901 


TRANSLATED  FROM  THE  GERMAN 


NEW     YORK 

THE  OUTDOOR  PRESS 
1914 


Copyright,    1014,   by 
The  Outdoor  Press 


Published  November,  1914 


VAIL-BALLOU     COMPANY 
BINSHAMTOM  AMD  HVM  YORK 


FOREWORD 

This  book  is  of  especial  importance  at 
this  time,  for  if  Germany  is  to  reach  the 
degree  of  advantage  which  her  military 
preparedness  seemed  to  prophesy,  it  is 
plain  that  her  navy  must  become  increas- 
ingly active,  and  play  a  far  different  role 
than  that  it  has  assumed  in  the  early  stages 
of  the  war. 

Covering  this  phase  of  the  German  op- 
erations the  present  volume  must  appeal 
as  forecasting  movements  strictly  within 
the  bounds  of  actuality.  A  literal  trans- 
lation is  all  that  has  been  attempted,  with 
absolutely  no  embellishment  to  make  it 
" popular"  or  easy  reading.  With  char- 
acteristic bluntness  this  German  officer 
brushes  aside  non-essentials  and  goes  to 
the  main  point  in  daring  fashion.     For 

5 


FOREWORD 

that  very  reason  it  is  exceedingly  perti- 
nent to  present-day  discussions. 

Issued  as  a  military  study  in  Germany, 
semi-official  in  nature,  to  characterize  it 
mildly,  the  material  herein  published  for 
the  first  time  in  English  reveals  the  theo- 
ries of  at  least  a  portion  of  the  military 
arm  of  the  German  Government,  which  it 
is  only  fair  to  state  may  not  represent  the 
convictions  of  the  German  people. 

Americans,  as  neutral  but  extremely  in- 
terested observers  of  happenings  of  the 
moment,  cannot  be  blamed,  however,  for 
making  note  of  revelations  that  may  come 
from  either  side  in  the  conflict.  Beyond 
that,  there  are  evidences  on  every  hand 
that  the  patriotic  citizens  of  this  country 
are  waking  to  the  necessity  to  face  more 
securely  the  difficulties  a  peace-loving 
nation  may  meet  because  of  its  lack  of 
enthusiasm  for  war. 

The  Publishers. 
6 


PREFACE 

The  purpose  of  this  book  is  to  estimate 
the  value  of  operation  over  the  sea  as  dem- 
onstrated in  modern  warfare,  to  point  out 
the  most  important  factors  in  its  accom- 
plishment, to  describe  the  powerful  ex- 
pedients provided  by  Germany  for  such 
an  enterprise,  and  to  broaden  the  sphere 
of  studying  these  important  questions  of 
interest  to  our  Fatherland. 

The  Author. 


CONTENTS 


PAGE 

Introduction 13 

Theoretical  Views 17 

I    Principles  of  Operations  Over  the  Sea     .      .  19 

II    Accomplishment  of  Sea  Transportation  .      .  27 

Preparations  During  Peace 27 

Preparations  at  the  Outbreak  of  War     .  39 

Embarkation        46 

Sea  Voyage 56 

Landing 62 

Operations 71 

PiEEMBABKATION 75 

Application 77 

I    Consideration       of       Landing       Operations 
Against  Powers  that  Can  be  Reached 

Only  by  Sea 79 

II    Views  on  Colonial  Expeditions     ....  93 

III    Concluding  Views 106 


OPERATIONS  UPON  THE  SEA 


INTRODUCTION 

Within  recent  years  we  have  had  a 
closer  view  of  operations  over  the  sea  in 
connection  with  wars  on  land.  The  war 
between  Japan  and  China,  between  Amer- 
ica and  Spain,  between  England  and  the 
Transvaal,  and  finally  the  Chinese  Ex- 
pedition, have  largely  demonstrated  the 
methods  of  transporting  troops  over  the 
sea.  Whilst  Moltke  has  shown  the  in- 
significance of  the  land  forces  for  such 
operations,  the  military  authorities  must 
in  the  future  reckon  on  the  important 
problem  of  preparing  for  and  conducting 
a  war  across  the  sea. 

Germany  has  greater  resources  for  en- 
terprises of  this  kind,  and  is  more  efficient, 
than  any  other  country.     The  excellent 

13 


INTRODUCTION 

training  and  readiness  for  war,  the  ra- 
pidity with  which  the  troops  can  be  mobil- 
ized, are  not  attained  by  any  other  power ; 
then,  too,  Germany  has  the  second  largest 
merchant  marine  in  the  world,  which  af- 
fords a  first-class  transport  fleet  not  sur- 
passed even  by  England's.  Finally,  the 
constant  improvement  and  strengthening 
of  our  battle  fleet  affords  additional  se- 
curity in  transporting  troops.  These 
especially  favorable  factors  make  possible 
a  wide  field  for  Germany's  activity  in 
world  politics.  It  is  feasible  for  us  to 
build  strong  military  forces  which  will  be 
of  great  use  to  the  Empire  in  this  direc- 
tion, to  secure  by  fighting  a  feared  and 
esteemed  position  in  the  world  such  as  we 
have  attained  in  Europe. 

In  this  connection,  it  must  be  admitted 

that  our  navy  cannot  in  the  near  future 

reach  the  degree  of  development  where  it 

would  be  in  a  position  alone  to  solve  for  us 

14 


INTRODUCTION 

the  problems  arising  from  energetic  par- 
ticipation  in  world  politics.  This  shows 
the  advisability  of  impressing  distant 
countries  that  believe  themselves  inacces- 
sible to  direct  attack  and  that  have 
hitherto  held  Germany  in  little  respect, 
with  the  size  and  strength  of  our  army. 
That  is  why  we  must  keep  in  mind  the  land 
operations  in  expeditions  over-sea. 

These  operations,  through  their  extent 
and  aims,  are  concerned  with  the  most 
vital  interests  of  the  various  nations,  and 
include  small  enterprises  which  would 
serve  to  acquire  commanding  positions  for 
war  as  well  as  for  colonial  requirements. 
All,  however,  emphasize  the  problems  of 
transporting,  which  vary  with  the  condi- 
tions of  wars  on  land  and  which  make 
distinct  demands  for  preparation.  These 
newly  found  difficulties  should  be  carefully 
examined  by  Germany. 


15 


THEORETICAL  VIEWS 


I.  Principles  of  Operations  Over 
the  Sea 

Since  steamers  have  supplanted  sailing 
ships  for  commercial  intercourse  it  is  pos- 
sible to  transport  our  large  troop  forces  in 
them;  but  fixed  plans  should  be  formu- 
lated with  the  view  of  making  use  of  these 
strong  and  numerous  vessels  in  over-seas 
operations.  The  main  difficulty  arises  in 
the  fact  that  all  sea  and  land  fighting 
forces  must  be  combined.  However,  any 
consequent  friction  can  easily  be  avoided 
if  the  army  and  fleet,  in  time  of  peace, 
become  familiar  with  their  mutual  de- 
pendence and  with  the  need  of  individual 
cooperation.  It  is  plain,  therefore,  that 
operations  over  the  sea  should  be  planned 
for  in  advance.     There  is  no  prospect  of 

19 


OPEKATIONS  UPON  THE  SEA 

success  unless  the  parts  of  the  complicated 
mechanism  are  individually  prepared. 

The  selection  of  a  favorable  time  and 
situation  for  operations  is  an  important 
factor  in  its  success.  If  an  unexpected 
landing  could  be  made  the  opponents 
would  not  succeed  in  making  a  strong  de- 
fense, nor  would  they  be  able  to  concen- 
trate sufficient  forces  to  oppose  the  in- 
vasion. Hence  the  preparation  of  the 
land  operations  must  be  so  thoroughly  ad- 
vanced that  in  case  of  war  the  rapidity  of 
mobilizing  and  transporting  would  assure 
an  advantageous  surprise.  How  difficult 
and  costly  this  task  is  has  been  demon- 
strated by  the  United  States  in  its  expe- 
dition to  Cuba  and  by  England  in  trans- 
porting its  first  troops  to  South  Africa. 

The  object  of  the  operation  must  by  all 

means  be  concealed  and  the  preliminar}^ 

preparations  should  be  planned  so  as  to 

delude    the    opponents.     Napoleon's    ex- 

20 


THEORETICAL  VIEWS 

pedition  against  Egypt  and  the  manner  in 
which  it  was  undertaken  even  to-day  re- 
mains a  standard  example. 

A  landing  operation  on  an  enemy's 
shore  is  generally  possible  only  where  one 
is  superior  in  naval  strength  to  that  which 
the  enemy  can  muster  at  a  critical  time. 
After  a  landing  a  victory  at  sea  by  our  op- 
ponents would  not  be  of  benefit  to  them, 
in  case  they  have  not  provided  sufficient 
land  fighting  forces  successfully  to  com- 
bat the  invasion.  Therefore,  it  is  impera- 
tive at  least  to  strengthen  our  German 
battle  fleet  so  greatly  that  it  would  assure 
the  troops  a  safe  passage,  and  also  defeat 
or  hold  in  check  that  portion  of  the  en- 
emy's naval  forces  which  they  could  read- 
ily employ. 

If  the  transports  sail  ahead  of  the  fleet 
there  is  the  possibility  that  with  a  reverse 
at  sea  the  landing  operations  could  not  be 
carried  through.     The  rule  to  be  followed 

21 


OPERATIONS  UPON  THE  SEA 

is  to  employ  for  operations  over  the  sea  all 
available  battleships,  part  in  the  regular 
fleet  and  part  as  an  escort  for  the  protec- 
tion of  the  transports.  In  no  case  should 
the  land  forces  be  transported  on  battle- 
ships, for  they  would  restrict  the  fighting 
value  of  the  ships.  So,  for  example,  the 
French  admiral  Gauthaunce — 1801 — in 
spite  of  his  superior  battle  fleet  was  com- 
pelled to  withdraw  to  Toulon  before  the 
English  fleet  because  his  ships  had  suffered 
in  fighting  value  through  the  presence  of 
land  troops. 

Only  the  largest  steamships  are  to  be 
considered  for  transports  because  they 
have  a  greater  field  for  action,  can  carry 
more  troops  and  require  a  smaller  escort 
of  battleships,  thereby  giving  a  small 
battle  fleet  like  ours  more  available 
strength,  which  is,  of  course,  of  great 
value. 

Naturally,  the  ships  should  be  loaded  to 
22 


THEORETICAL  VIEWS 

a  capacity  in  proportion  to  the  length  of 
the  voyage.  In  cases  where  the  distance 
is  not  great  the  transport  ships  can  make 
the  trip  twice,  but  it  is  important  that  the 
principal  part  of  the  expedition  go  in  the 
first  transports  so  as  not  to  land  an  in- 
efficient force  on  the  enemy's  coast.  The 
whole  purpose  of  the  enterprise  might  be 
defeated  through  lack  of  aggressive 
strength  of  the  landing  troops.  The  num- 
ber of  troops  to  be  landed  must  be  greater 
than  the  estimated  number  of  the  enemy. 
As  they  must  be  able  to  assume  the  of- 
fensive, it  is  desirable  that  the  militia  be 
debarred  and  only  well  drilled  forces, 
under  experienced  officers,  be  sent  over. 
Such  a  combination  gives  the  required 
fighting  value. 

In  spite  of  the  difficulty  experienced  in 
transporting  horses,  the  cavalry  is  an  ex- 
tremely valuable  adjunct  in  operations  of 
invasion,  playing  a  great  part  in  offensive 

23 


OPERATIONS  UPON  THE  SEA 

movements  and  in  assisting  the  field  and 
heavy  artillery.  The  cavalry  will  also  be 
able  to  prevent  an  attack  on  the  infantry, 
which  might  otherwise  inflict  damage  hard 
to  retrieve.  In  the  Crimean  War  Mar- 
shal St.  Arnault  was  hindered  in  the  pur- 
suit of  the  routed  Russians  because  of  the 
deficiency  in  the  cavalry  and  artillery  in 
the  French  army.  He  had  only  one  hun- 
dred troopers  at  his  disposal,  and  his  guns, 
drawn  by  only  four  horses,  were  greatly 
hampered  in  their  movements. 

The  difficulties  in  transporting  large 
cavalry  and  artillery  divisions  can  be  over- 
come through  modern  methods.  The  ex- 
tent of  our  merchant  marine  makes  it  pos- 
sible to  forward  the  necessary  number  of 
troops,  but  it  must  be  remembered  that 
on  account  of  our  present  political  posi- 
tion we  can  send  only  as  strong  a  force  as 
we  can  afford  to  dispense  with  at  home, 
without  endangering  the  country. 

24 


THEORETICAL  VIEWS 

The  management  of  the  complete  opera- 
tion over  the  sea  as  a  rule  can  be  better 
executed  by  an  army  officer  than  by  a 
naval  officer,  for  the  success  of  the  enter- 
prise depends  principally  on  the  land 
operations.  This  leadership  would  usu- 
ally fall  to  the  commanding  officer  of  the 
transport  fleet  and  escorting  squadron. 
It  is  out  of  the  question  to  change  com- 
mands at  such  a  critical  period  as  disem- 
barking. With  us  the  commander-in- 
chief  of  the  transport  troops  is  lower  in 
rank  than  the  commander  of  the  escorting 
squadron,  a  designation  which  the  vicissi- 
tudes of  war  have  found  very  disadvan- 
tageous. More  than  one  well-planned 
operation  has  been  restrained  by  the  com- 
manding admiral  because  he  sacrificed 
favorable  conditions  from  the  standpoint 
of  land  operations  to  gain  a  slight  advan- 
tage from  a  naval  standpoint.  On  the 
other  hand,  Napoleon  I,  against  the  advice 

25 


OPERATIONS  UPON  THE  SEA 

of  his  admirals,  disembarked  his  troops  in 
Egypt,  and  thereby  kept  them  from  shar- 
ing the  fate  of  the  fleet. 

After  successful  landings  it  may  be  nec- 
essary to  place  the  transport  fleet  and  its 
escort  in  command  of  the  chief  of  the  land 
troops.  Even  the  battle  fleet  should  be 
under  his  direction  when  a  change  of  base 
is  necessary  or  when  the  land  and  sea  for- 
ces are  in  joint  action.  For  technical 
naval  questions  the  chief  command  would 
be  assigned  to  an  officer  of  the  Admiral 
Staff.  In  a  joint  attack  on  a  coast  city 
the  advantage  of  harmony  and  cooperation 
is  readily  seen.  In  the  battle  on  the 
Alma  this  fact  was  demonstrated,  the 
striking  of  the  fleet  on  the  flank  was  not 
ordered  by  the  commander  of  the  land 
forces  and  was  not  brought  about  in  uni- 
son with  the  land  attack. 


26 


II.  Accomplishment  of  Sea  Trans- 
portation 

preparations  during  peace. 

Whether  the  operations  be  large  or 
small,  full  preparations  must  be  made  dur- 
ing peace.  These  preparations  include 
first  of  all  the  drawing  up  of  plans 
through  the  study  of  political  and  mili- 
tary relations.  Then  the  operations  can 
be  carried  out  under  international  juris- 
diction, avoiding  thereby  any  disturbances 
of  importance.  The  possibilities  of  fric- 
tion must  be  given  careful  thought. 

First  of  all,  a  base  for  prospective  op- 
erations must  be  determined  by  exhaustive 
investigations  as  to  landings  that  may  be 
suitable.  While  the  first  inquiries  are 
made  by  naval  officers,  they  can  only  be 
completed  by  army  officers.  The  follow- 
27 


OPEBATIONS  UPON  THE  SEA 

ing  essential  points  must  be  kept  in  view 
in  searches  made  by  naval  officers : 

I.  To  determine  the  naval  strength  re- 
quired for  protection  of  the  transport 
fleet  and  to  settle  the  question  of  communi- 
cation with  home  ports. 

II.  To  decide  upon  proper  and  specific 
points  on  the  respective  coasts,  from  a  ma- 
rine standpoint. 

III.  To  investigate  all  harbor  facilities 
for  the  disembarking  of  the  troops,  and 
to  ascertain  the  number  and  size  of  ships 
the  harbor  will  admit  so  as  to  insure  the 
protection  of  the  land  and  sea  flank. 

IV.  To  study  the  enemy's  coast  de- 
fenses and  decide  upon  the  strength  re- 
quired to  attack  them. 

The  researches  of  the  army  officers  con- 
cern principally  the  following: 

I.  The  aim  of  the  operations  is  to  over- 
come the  obstacles  as  reported  by  the 
naval  officers. 

28 


THEORETICAL  VIEWS 

II.  The  number  of  troops  which  the  op- 
ponents can  muster  against  the  invasion 
should  be  estimated. 

III.  All  questions  as  to  climate,  water 
supply,  and  equipment  necessary  should 
be  decided. 

All  this  information  has  been  shown  to 
be  of  distinct  value,  and  perhaps  would 
cause  us  to  alter,  within  the  next  year,  the 
disposition  of  the  line  of  battle  in  case  of 
war.  Through  a  well  ordered  intelligence 
department  definite  plans  can  be  made. 

Regarding  operations  which  require 
troops  fitted  for  tropical  service,  capable 
officers  and  forces  should  be  reviewed  and 
inspected  during  times  of  peace  and  made 
note  of  accordingly.  The  division  would 
make  a  suitable  unit  for  large  operations 
and  could  be  formed  from  different  army 
corps.  These  divisions  should  be  so 
equipped  that  they  could  operate  in- 
dependently in  customary  situations. 
29 


OPERATIONS  UPON  THE  SEA 

Fuller  preparations  should  be  made  for 
the  sending  of  heavy  artillery,  the  tele- 
graph and  airship  divisions.  These  for- 
mations would  be  important  problems 
during  the  voyage  at  sea.  An  especially 
skilled  staff  is  needed.  To  this  end,  load- 
ing transports  and  landing  maneuvers  for 
the  heavy  artillery  and  other  heavy  divi- 
sions should  take  place  annually  in  suit- 
able harbors  on  coasts  that  present  the 
right  opportunities  for  the  troops.  An 
enlarged  command  of  officers  and  subor- 
dinate officers  would  show  sufficient 
strength  in  a  relatively  short  time.  Inci- 
dentally it  might  be  possible  to  have  these 
maneuvers  take  place  in  our  foreign  pos- 
sessions, where  we  could  better  determine 
the  actual  needs  of  operations  of  this  sort. 
This  training  would  bring  forth  the  sim- 
plest and  best  means  for  the  adjustment 
of  our  merchant  marine  for  transporting 
troops.  All  other  expedients  for  the  voy- 
30 


THEOEETICAL  VIEWS 

age  would  likewise  be  shown.  Some  of 
this  needed  experience  has  already 
been  acquired  through  our  expedition  to 
China. 

Just  as  a  detailed  plan  of  mobilization 
is  required  for  any  war  on  land,  a  com- 
plete plan  is  necessary  for  operations  over 
the  sea  which  embraces  also  the  railway 
trip  to  the  harbor  and  the  rapid  execution 
of  the  tasks  involved  in  embarking.  On 
account  of  limited  facilities  only  one  di- 
vision can  be  handled  on  a  railroad.  The 
necessity  for  transfer  by  wagons  to  the 
ships  requires  enlarged  railway  stations 
and  piers  in  many  places.  Furthermore, 
many  different  supply  depots  must  be 
built  and  maintained.  In  these  depots 
building  material  should  be  held  in  reserve 
for  the  alterations  that  are  needed  for  the 
transformation  of  the  merchant  ships  into 
transports.  All  other  apparatus  for  suc- 
cessful transporting,  such  as  extra  lifting 

31 


OPERATIONS  UPON  THE  SEA 

contrivances,  flat-bottom  boats,  gang 
planks,  and  so  forth,  should  be  stored  in 
advance.  Usually,  these  adjuncts  are 
lacking  in  the  merchant  marine.  Light 
railroad  rolling  stock  for  use  in  the  tropics 
or  in  difficult  land  conditions  is  also 
recommended. 

In  addition  to  these  supply  depots 
there  must  be  in  all  harbors  large  ware- 
houses containing  clothing,  food  and 
coal.  The  small  requirements  of  our 
transport  to  China  did  not  emphasize  suf- 
ficiently the  value  of  advance  prepara- 
tions, but  it  is  evident  that  within  a  few 
days  over  one  hundred  steamers  should  be 
provided  with  such  accommodations.  To 
do  this  in  an  emergency  would  require  too 
much  time  aside  from  the  difficulty  that 
might  be  encountered  in  securing  skilled 
labor. 

For  long  distance  transportation  our 
large  harbors  on  the  North  and  East  seas 
32 


THEORETICAL  VIEWS 

can  be  utilized  equally  well  for  embarka- 
tion. Speed  is  the  chief  requisite.  In 
order  to  lessen  the  distance  of  transport- 
ing, operations  toward  the  west  must  be 
conducted  from  the  North  Sea  ports  and 
toward  the  east  from  our  east  sea  ports. 
This  does  not  preclude  the  possibility  of 
towing  the  transports  from  the  east  sea 
through  the  Kaiser  Wilhelm  Canal  to  the 
North  Sea  should  it  be  found  desirable, 
but  it  would  involve  a  waste  of  time.  The 
smaller  harbors  should  not  be  used  for  em- 
barking for  large  enterprises  because  they 
lack  the  necessary  facilities.  They  might 
be  utilized  to  advantage  in  a  smaller  way, 
provided  sufficient  means  were  at  hand  to 
take  care  of  one  division  a  day.  Espe- 
cially suitable  harbors  on  the  North  Sea 
are  Emden,  Wilhelmshaven  and  Bremer- 
haven,  in  connection  with  Bremen,  and 
Cuxhaven  with  Hamburg  and  Gliickstadt. 
These  are  the  harbors  that  should  have 
33 


OPERATIONS  UPON  THE  SEA 

complete  preparations  made  for  possible 
expeditions. 

Bremerhaven  is  by  far  the  best.  In 
every  respect  it  would  take  first  place  for 
embarkation,  because  of  its  extensive 
wharfs.  From  this  point  two  or  more  di- 
visions could  be  shipped  daily  without 
difficulty.  Cuxhaven  is  not  so  well  sit- 
uated, but  its  connection  with  Hamburg 
is  important.  If  it  were  brought  up  to 
full  development  it  could  take  care  of  two 
divisions  a  day  which  Hamburg  could  well 
supply.  Gliickstadt  is  an  especially  im- 
portant base  because  most  of  our  live 
stock  exporting  business  is  carried  on 
there.  It  is  recommended  that  a  short 
double-track  railroad  be  built  from  Elm- 
shorn  to  Gliickstadt,  making  a  connection 
with  the  reserve  corps  frontier.  In 
Gliickstadt  one  infantry  division  and  part 
of  a  cavalry  division  can  be  shipped. 

In  Wilhelmshaven  all  the  essential  f  ea- 
34 


THEORETICAL  VIEWS 

tures  are  at  hand,  but  it  is  doubtful 
whether,  in  view  of  simultaneous  mobili- 
zation of  the  fleet,  this  place  can  be  chosen 
for  the  embarkation  of  land  troops.  In 
any  event,  it  would  be  necessary  to  enlarge 
the  harbor  buildings.  The  railroad  facili- 
ties would  also  have  to  be  increased. 

While  Emden  is  favorably  situated,  an 
examination  discloses  many  drawbacks. 
It  needs  better  dock  facilities  and  rail- 
roads to  bring  it  up  to  standard  and  in 
order  to  relieve  the  extensive  shipping  of 
troops  at  Wilhelmshaven.  Under  exist- 
ing circumstances  Leer  and  Papenburg 
could  be  used  for  transporting  purposes, 
and  these  two  with  Emden  could  handle 
one  division. 

The  situation  on  the  Baltic  Sea  is 
peculiarly  unfavorable,  no  harbor,  with 
the  exception  of  Kiel,  being  deep  enough 
to  accommodate  our  larger  steamships. 
At    Danzig    the    dredging    of   navigable 

35 


OPERATIONS  UPON  THE  SEA 

waters  and  extension  of  docks  should  be 
planned,  which  are  of  great  importance 
from  a  military  standpoint.  The  other 
smaller  ports  on  the  Baltic  are  at  present 
not  suitable  for  transporting  troops. 

The  Kiel  harbor  could  not  be  utilized  for 
the  loading  of  large  transports  because  of 
the  same  conditions  that  affect  Wilhelms- 
haven,  namely,  the  delay  that  might  hin- 
der the  rapid  mobilizing  of  the  fleet,  which 
would  not  be  permitted.  The  docks  at 
Kiel  must  therefore  be  greatly  enlarged 
so  that  they  could  thoroughly  satisfy  sim- 
ultaneously the  demands  of  the  battle  and 
transport  fleets.  Pillau  and  Swinemunde 
should  be  authorized  to  extend  their  very 
small  docks.  On  the  other  hand,  the  large 
dry  docks  in  Danzig,  Stettin  and  Kiel 
should  be  in  a  position,  within  the  shortest 
possible  time,  to  provide  the  necessary 
buildings   for  transporting,   if  the  ma- 

36 


THEORETICAL  VIEWS 

terials  and  warehouses  are  planned  cor- 
rectly. 

Of  the  greatest  importance  in  opera- 
tions over  the  sea  is  the  provision  of  the 
proper  number  of  ships.  Defects  in 
preparations  in  time  of  peace  would  hin- 
der successful  execution  and  would  give 
the  enemy  time  to  take  the  necessary  pre- 
cautions to  oppose  an  invasion.  Yet 
it  should  be  stated  that  England,  at  the 
outbreak  of  the  Boer,  although  lacking 
full  preparation  during  peace,  in  the 
course  of  a  few  weeks  procured  the  re- 
quired number  of  ships  for  the  first  ship- 
ment. 

The  problem  of  ship  control  would  at 
best  fall  to  the  loading  commission,  which 
should  be  settled  upon  as  an  established 
authority  to  make  a  comprehensive  sur- 
vey and  appraise  the  German  steamers 
for  military  transporting.     This  commis- 

37 


OPERATIONS  UPON  THE  SEA 

sion  should  also  list  the  foreign-owned 
steamers  which  might  be  available  in 
the  harbors  for  use  in  emergencies. 
Through  close  commercial  relations  this 
control  can  be  extended  to  neighboring 
foreign  ports  (Amsterdam,  Rotterdam, 
Copenhagen)  to  the  end  that  we  might 
charter  several  large  foreign  steamers. 

The  construction  of  stables  for  horses 
on  our  commercial  ships  would  cause  de- 
lay, as  we  have  pointed  out  previously. 
It  would  seem  advantageous  to  have  our 
subsidized  steamship  companies  to  build 
several  ships  which  can  be  quickly  ad- 
justed for  shipping  horses.  This  ought  to 
be  an  easy  matter  with  ships  used  for  ship- 
ping cattle.  The  Hamburg-American 
Line,  it  is  known,  will  readily  provide 
such  a  ship. 

The  management  of  the  transport  de- 
pots and  the  training  of  the  dry-dock  and 
harbor  personnel  would  obviously  fall  to 

38 


THEORETICAL  VIEWS 

the  loading  commission.  In  a  similar 
way,  the  navy  would  be  permitted  to  di- 
vide the  sea-fighting  strength,  in  the  event 
of  mobilization,  into  a  fleet  of  warships 
and  an  escort  for  the  transport  fleet,  as- 
suring effective  protection  and  a  fighting 
force  equal  in  rank  to  the  enemy. 

PREPARATIONS  AT  THE  OUTBREAK  OF  WAR. 

Actual  preparations  for  war  cannot  be 
kept  secret  for  any  length  of  time.  Op- 
ponents would  receive  information 
through  secret  channels,  which  would  give 
them  opportunity  to  concentrate  and 
equip  their  forces.  The  immediate 
preparations  before  the  outbreak  of  war 
dare  not  be  instituted  generally,  but  as 
soon  as  the  decision  for  operations  is  con- 
ceived, they  must  be  promptly  inaugu- 
rated. The  aim  should  be  to  keep  the  op- 
ponents in  uncertainty  for  a  short  time, 
and  then  a  rapidly  executed  operation 
39 


OPERATIONS  UPON  THE  SEA 

would  take  them  unawares.  An  unex- 
pected attack  depends  largely  upon  ra- 
pidity of  movement.  Incidentally,  diplo- 
matic pressure  should  be  avoided  if  pos- 
sible because  such  friction  would  lessen 
considerably  the  chances  for  a  successful 
undertaking. 

In  connection  with  wars  on  land  the 
preliminary  preparations  are  simplified, 
for  under  these  circumstances  most  of  the 
battleships  and  troops  have  been  equipped 
and  prepared  for  action.  The  methods  to 
be  employed  by  the  battleships  to  carry 
out  the  operations  would  vary  and  must 
be  left  to  the  discretion  of  the  chosen 
naval  expert.  It  should  be  pointed  out  in 
this  connection,  however,  that  with  a  small 
battle  fleet  like  ours  it  is  most  necessary  to 
concentrate  our  full  strength  for  the  de- 
fense and  execution  of  the  land  opera- 
tions. We  must  endeavor,  therefore,  in 
time  of  peace  to  get  our  fleet  forces  out  of 
40 


THEORETICAL  VIEWS 

foreign  waters  and  keep  the  battle  fleet 
together.  Thus  the  great  political  ques- 
tions would  be  decided  only  upon  the  Eu- 
ropean scene. 

A  rapid  mobilization  of  our  sea  fighting 
forces,  namely,  those  which  belong  to  the 
battle  fleet,  is  of  great  advantage,  but  the 
calling  in  from  foreign  waters  of  such 
forces  would  undoubtedly  serve  to  create 
suspicion.  The  Kaiser  Wilhelm  Canal 
affords  us  the  means  to  concentrate  these 
forces  quickly  as  may  be  required  either  in 
the  North  or  Baltic  Sea. 

If  the  demands  for  ships  and  supplies 
exceed  our  advance  preparations,  proper 
methods  should  be  employed  to  seize 
quickly  what  is  needed  and  immediate 
reparation  made.  Plans  should  also  be 
made  to  secure  sufficient  reenforcements 
of  troops.  In  large  operations  where  all 
our  ships  are  employed,  after  they  are  suc- 
cessfully loaded  and  started  on  the  voyage 
41 


OPERATIONS  UPON  THE  SEA 

the  transports  arriving  from  foreign 
waters  can  be  equipped.  All  ships  be- 
longing to  hostile  nations  that  are  lying  in 
our  harbors  we  would  of  course  seize  and 
utilize  for  transports. 

While  the  distribution  of  our  transport 
steamers  at  the  various  points  of  embark- 
ation will  have  been  taken  care  of  by  the 
loading  commission,  various  difficulties 
would  be  encountered  in  altering  the  ves- 
sels that  by  chance  are  at  the  disposal  of 
the  commission  for  transports,  such  as  un- 
foreseen defects  and  inaccurate  measure- 
ments of  the  foreign  chartered  steamers 
arriving  in  our  ports.  The  adjustment 
and  equipment  of  these  ships  must  be  ex- 
pedited so  that  the  troops  can  be  de- 
spatched in  masses  as  fast  as  they  arrive. 
Once  the  ships  reach  the  selected  harbors 
the  necessary  rearrangements  probably 
can  be  made  simultaneously  with  the  load- 
ing, depending  upon  the  advance  prepara- 

42 


THEORETICAL  VIEWS 

tions  and  the  presence  of  a  skilled  staff  of 
workmen.  The  time  needed  will  depend 
somewhat  upon  the  length  of  the  voyage 
to  be  made. 

In  England  the  steamers  for  transport- 
ing troops  to  Cape  Town,  which  is  a  long 
trip,  were  prepared  in  four  days  for  the 
infantry  and  in  seven  days  for  the  cavalry 
and  artillery.  The  consuming  of  such 
time,  even  for  a  long  sea  voyage,  must  be 
considered  poor  execution.  At  the  time 
of  our  expedition  to  China  we  had  the 
ships  complete  in  a  short  time.  For  one 
steamer,  the  discharge  of  the  cargo,  re- 
adjustment for  transport  and  reloading, 
with  the  exception  of  the  cavalry,  not 
more  than  two  days  need  be  consumed. 
For  short  distances,  according  to  English 
and  Russian  estimates,  one  day  is  required 
for  infantry  and  two  to  two  and  one-half 
days  for  cavalry  and  artillery.  These  pe- 
riods can  be  greatly  shortened  through  the 
43 


OPERATIONS  UPON  THE  SEA 

efficiency  of  the  building  staff,  as  pointed 
out  previously. 

The  formation  of  the  expedition  corps 
must  of  course  be  established  in  the  an- 
nual maneuvers.  Various  factors,  such 
as  seasons,  political  aims,  present  situa- 
tion of  opponents,  extent  of  material  for 
the  available  ships,  all  bear  witness  to  the 
urgency  of  taking  up  measures  in  advance 
for  facilitating  the  work  of  mobilization. 
The  speedy  concentration  of  troops  and 
materials  at  the  points  of  embarkation 
will  make  heavy  demands  upon  the  rail- 
roads, even  though  the  haul  is  short,  and 
the  shipment  comparatively  small.  Ar- 
rangements should  therefore  be  made  with 
the  railroads  to  have  on  hand  at  all  times 
sufficient  rolling  stock  for  these  purposes, 
to  guarantee  the  prompt  departure  of  the 
transports.  It  is  urged  that  authority  be 
given  the  loading  commission  to  supervise 
and  direct  this  work.  It  must  be  taken 
44 


THEORETICAL  VIEWS 

into  consideration  that  part  of  the  troops 
are  inexperienced  reserves  and  good  order 
mnst  be  maintained.  A  high  standard  of 
efficiency  should  prevail,  to  lessen  the  bur- 
dens of  executing  orders. 

Numerous  machine  gun  divisions  in- 
crease the  fighting  strength  and  do  not 
require  great  space  or  support.  The  use- 
fulness of  a  cyclist  division  depends  en- 
tirely upon  the  condition  of  the  roads  in 
the  hostile  country.  For  the  reasons 
stated  previously,  cavalry  would  not  suf- 
fer in  distribution  of  strength,  which  is 
customary  in  wars  on  land.  In  large 
over-seas  operations  it  is  recommended 
that  a  special  cavalry  division  or  brigade 
be  formed  for  reconnoitering  purposes. 
Beyond  this,  the  strength  of  the  cavalry 
division  must  be  sufficient  to  render  pos- 
sible an  independent  operation.  It  would 
also  be  of  great  value  to  the  field  artillery, 
of  which  an  ample  supply  is  on  hand. 
45 


OPERATIONS  UPON  THE  SEA 

Especially  important  is  the  method  of 
distributing  supply  trains,  for  these  re- 
quire a  great  deal  of  space  and  render 
landing  very  difficult.  They  also  hinder 
the  rapid  movement  of  the  expedition 
corps.  When  the  transports  do  not  re- 
main in  close  communication  with  the 
troops  after  landing,  a  very  large  supply 
of  stores  is  necessary  to  make  the  army 
independent  of  the  vessels.  There  should 
be  added,  therefore,  a  reserve  ammunition 
column  to  that  already  provided. 

A  fixed  amount  of  supplies  should  be 
determined  upon,  taking  due  considera- 
tion of  the  extent  of  the  voyage.  The 
troops  could  requisition  some  materials 
from  the  hostile  country. 

EMBARKATION. 

Proper  loading  is  the  business  of  the 
land  forces  and  should  be  conducted  by 
trained  officers  so  as  to  ensure  the  ship- 

46 


THEOKETICAL  VIEWS 

ment  of  materials  and  men.  To  make 
landing  effective  the  necessary  supplies 
should  go  on  the  vessels  with  the  troops. 
A  loading  plan  should  be  so  drawn  up  in 
advance  as  to  meet  all  emergencies.  The 
length  of  time  consumed  for  loading  de- 
pends on  the  distance  of  the  voyage. 

At  the  most  the  limit  of  a  short  sea  voy- 
age for  us  has  been  considered  about 
forty-eight  hours.  This  is  too  small  an 
estimate;  it  should  undoubtedly  be  dou- 
bled. The  Italian  General  Staff  estimates 
the  length  of  a  short  sea  voyage  to  be  five 
days.  Besides,  to  preserve  the  fighting 
worth  of  our  troops,  we  must  allow  suffi- 
cient time  for  rest. 

The  troop  transport  capacity  of  a  ship 
has  heretofore  been  calculated  by  the 
ship's  tonnage,  that  is,  sixty  per  cent,  of 
the  ship's  capacity  is  net  ton  loading 
space.  The  necessary  space  for  us,  for  a 
long  sea  voyage,  is  set  at  two  tons  for  each 

47 


OPERATIONS  UPON  THE  SEA 

man  and  six  to  seven  tons  for  each  horse. 
The  English  and  Russian  estimates  are 
about  the  same.  But  the  English  trans- 
ports to  Cape  Town  accommodated  a 
larger  number  of  troops  than  was  thought 
possible,  and  the  American  transports  to 
Cuba  were  increased  by  one-third. 

As  for  the  arrangements  which  must  be 
made  for  sleeping,  cooking  and  washing 
and  for  a  hospital  service,  we  need  not  go 
any  further  here,  as  they  have  been  dis- 
cussed at  length  in  the  press.  The  stow- 
ing of  equipment  and  baggage  should  be 
done  in  such  a  way  as  to  make  the  articles 
available  on  landing  in  the  order  in  which 
they  are  needed.  The  ship's  space  re- 
quired for  maintenance  supplies  for  man 
and  horse  figures  relatively  as  about  one  to 
five. 

Coming  next  to  the  loading  of  the  artil- 
lery, the  rule  should  be  to  place  all 
common  and  machine  guns  on  deck.  A 
48 


THEOEETICAL  VIEWS 

certain  amount  of  ammunition  should  be 
stowed  so  as  to  be  quickly  accessible. 
This  is  an  essential  measure  to  afford  the 
transport  protection  from  some  privateer. 
The  guns  should  be  securely  placed  to 
prevent  their  movement  by  the  motion  of 
the  sea  and  to  render  feasible  their  use  on 
deck.  Trials  will  soon  be  made  to  find  the 
suitable  means  whereby  field  artillery  may 
be  put  to  successful  use  on  shipboard,  and 
this  testing  will  certainly  repay  us.  All 
rolling  stock  will  be  stowed  away  firmly  in 
the  freight  space  without  removing  the 
wheels.  The  material  and  personnel  of 
the  field  hospital  should  be  divided  among 
the  ships,  so  that  a  ship 's  hospital  division 
may  be  formed.  The  airship  division 
should  be  placed  on  deck  in  such  fashion 
that  observation  flights  may  be  made  dur- 
ing the  voyage. 

The  shipping  of  horses  is  especially  dif- 
ficult.   By  former  methods  the  horses  had 
49 


OPERATIONS  UPON  THE  SEA 

to  stand  the  entire  trip  and  had  practi- 
cally no  exercise.  This  left  them  in  a 
weakened  condition  and  made  necessary  a 
long  rest  after  arrival.  For  a  war  trans- 
port, in  which  is  required  a  rapid  and  suc- 
cessful offensive,  such  horses  are  not 
useful.  Because  of  the  important  work  to 
be  done  by  them  after  landing,  careful  at- 
tention should  be  given  to  the  horses  to 
keep  them  in  good  working  condition.  To 
this  end,  proper  nourishment  must  be 
given  and  facilities  provided  for  daily  ex- 
ercise while  on  the  transports,  which 
should  consume  at  least  three-quarters  of 
an  hour  for  each  horse. 

Ships  that  are  built  particularly  for  the 
transportation  of  horses  can  be  adjusted 
with  four  decks  over  each  other,  including 
upper  deck  stables  and  two  courses  for  ex- 
ercise, so  that  a  transport  of  from  three  to 
four  thousand  net  tons  capacity  can  carry 
over  one  thousand  horses.     Three  ships 

50 


THEORETICAL  VIEWS 

would  accommodate  two  cavalry  brigades. 
On  every  large  steamer  many  horses  can 
be  shipped  for  a  long  trip,  in  addition  to 
its  regular  quota  of  men  and  supplies. 

After  the  transports  have  been  pre- 
pared, about  seven  hundred  and  fifty 
horses,  equal  to  one  cavalry  regiment,  or 
six  batteries,  can  be  loaded  daily  on  the 
lower  decks.  Cleanliness,  ventilation  and 
care  are  the  three  most  important  factors 
for  the  good  health  of  the  horses.  Every 
horse  transport  must  be  given  ventilating 
apparatus  to  assure  sufficient  fresh  air. 
Artificial  ventilation  is  to  be  preferred  to 
natural  ventilation,  for  if  the  latter  be- 
comes too  strong  the  horses'  lungs  are 
easily  affected.  Through  this  cause,  for 
example,  the  American  transport  to  Cuba 
lost  the  greater  number  of  their  horses. 

Likewise  condensers  are  required  for 
the  necessary  quantities  of  drinking  water. 
It  is  recommended  that  each  ship  be  given 
51 


OPERATIONS  UPON  THE  SEA 

its  own  condenser.  The  provision  of  only 
one  or  two  large  condensers  on  special 
ships  which  supply  the  entire  demand  of 
the  transport  fleet,  as  the  Americans  em- 
ployed in  their  expedition  to  Cuba,  has  not 
proved  practical. 

For  the  short  sea  voyage,  our  transports 
would  be  able  to  despatch  substantially 
more  troops,  through  Germany's  geo- 
graphical position.  The  strength  of 
near-by  powers  requires,  though,  the  im- 
mediate utilization  of  all  ships  and  mate- 
rials at  our  disposal,  if  the  operations  are 
to  succeed.  For  short  expeditions,  the 
general  rule  will  be  to  ship  as  many  troops 
as  the  transports  will  carry.  The  forces 
will  bivouac  on  the  upper  and  lower  decks 
and  receive  only  straw  bags  and  covers. 
They  will  keep  their  whole  baggage  with 
them.  Cooking  will  be  done  in  large  field 
kettles.  If  time  permits,  it  is  recom- 
mended that  the  same  adjustments  as  for 
52 


THEORETICAL  VIEWS 

a  long  journey  be  made  for  the  horses,  at 
least  to  provide  separate  stalls.  This  will 
prevent  heavy  losses  in  case  of  rough 
weather.  Guns  and  accessories  can  be 
disposed  of  in  the  same  manner  as  for  long 
voyages. 

The  length  of  time  for  embarkation  de- 
pends on  whether  the  loading  can  be  done 
from  the  wharves  of  the  harbors  or 
whether  the  troops  and  materials  must  be 
taken  out  by  lighters  and  then  transferred 
to  the  ships.  The  latter  method  is  a  waste 
of  time  and  is  dependent  on  wind  and 
weather. 

The  time  required  for  loading  is  as  fol- 
lows: Fifteen  minutes  for  one  hundred 
men,  one  minute  for  one  horse,  ten  min- 
utes for  a  cannon.  In  an  operation  by  the 
Russians,  8,000  men,  including  infantry 
and  cavalry,  were  embarked  in  eight 
hours.  In  our  loading  of  East  Asia  trans- 
ports, it  required  one  to  one  and  one-half 
53 


OPERATIONS  UPON  THE  SEA 

hours  to  load  one  battalion.  The  speed  of 
our  loading  has  amazed  departmental  cir- 
cles in  general.  It  is  certain,  though,  that 
this  time  can  be  greatly  reduced  through 
detailed  preparation  and  training.  Na- 
poleon I,  in  the  year  1795,  had  ostensibly 
drilled  his  troops  so  well  that  he  could 
plan  to  put  132,000  men  and  their  mate- 
rials on  shipboard  in  two  hours. 

It  must  be  remembered  that  everything, 
troops,  guns  and  supplies  must  eventually 
be  landed  on  open  coasts.  Portable  flat- 
bottom  boats  and  building  materials  for 
piers  must  therefore  be  carried  on  the 
transports.  Special  vessels  must  accom- 
pany the  transport  fleet  with  large  reserve 
supplies  of  food,  equipment,  ammunition, 
coal  and  so  forth.  A  cable-laying  ship  is 
also  required. 

We  must  now  consider  to  what  extent 
Germany  is  able  to  load  forces  for  the  ex- 
ecution of  operations  which  involve  only 
54 


THEORETICAL  VIEWS 

a  short  voyage,  in  which  success  depends 
so  much  on  speed.  For  embarkation  on 
the  North  Sea,  Hamburg  and  Bremen 
alone  could  furnish  so  many  steamers 
capable  of  being  converted  into  trans- 
ports, that  with  their  tonnage  capacity  the 
loading  of  four  infantry  divisions  is  pos- 
sible in  a  period  of  four  days.  With  the 
addition  of  ships  from  Emden,  Wilhelms- 
haven,  Gluckstadt  and  Kiel  we  would  be 
able  to  despatch  in  the  same  length  of 
time,  at  least  six  infantry  divisions,  or  five 
infantry  and  one  cavalry  division.  To 
these  must  be  added  several  especially 
large  and  fast  German  steamers,  partly 
for  the  shipment  that  might  be  delayed 
and  partly  to  expedite  the  return  to  home 
waters.  A  large  number  of  troops  can 
also  be  shipped  from  Baltic  ports.  Be- 
sides this,  a  repeated  trip  of  the  transport 
fleet  is  possible  if  the  command  of  the  sea 
is  maintained  continuously. 
55 


OPERATIONS  UPON  THE  SEA 

For  longer  sea  voyages,  in  which  the 
importance  of  speed  is  not  so  great,  our 
transport  fleet  can  be  greatly  increased 
through  chartering  or  purchasing  ships  of 
foreign  nations.  Still,  we  are  at  present 
in  the  position  to  despatch  about  four  in- 
fantry divisions,  with  present  available 
ships,  within  ten  or  twelve  days. 

SEA  VOYAGE. 

For  transporting  troops  over  the  sea, 
it  is  the  chief  problem  of  the  navy  to  clear 
the  course  to  the  hostile  shore.  All  enter- 
prises of  this  kind  are  dependent  on  the 
battle  fleet,  whose  first  aim,  therefore, 
must  be  to  run  down  and  attack  the  ene- 
my's fleet  which  the  transports  might  en- 
counter; if  the  opportunity  is  afforded 
our  fleet  must  bring  about  an  engagement 
for  the  command  of  the  sea  at  least  by  the 
time  of  embarkation.  As  the  mobilizing 
of  the  battle  ships  is  finished  before  the 
56 


THEOEETICAL  VIEWS 

transport  fleet  is  ready  to  put  to  sea,  they 
can  undertake  an  early  offensive  to  make 
secure  the  passage  of  the  expedition. 
Also,  throughout  the  voyage  offensive  op- 
erations can  be  undertaken  by  the  battle 
fleet,  in  waters  distant  from  the  transport, 
which  would  serve  the  same  ends  of  keep- 
ing the  course  clear. 

The  escorts  of  the  transport  squadron 
should  consist  of  just  enough  ships  to  give 
immediate  protection.  A  large  number 
would  increase  unnecessarily  the  size  of 
the  transport  fleet  without  increasing  its 
safety,  while  every  addition  of  strength  to 
the  battle  fleet  is  of  the  greatest  value. 
The  task  of  the  escorts  is  only  to  protect 
the  transports  from  attacks  by  single  or 
several  small  vessels  of  the  enemy.  Our 
torpedo  boats  are  particularly  adapted 
for  escort  service,  and  make  it  feasible  to 
restrict  the  number  of  large  battle  ships 
used  for  this  purpose.  During  the  assem- 
57 


OPERATIONS  UPON  THE  SEA 

bling  of  the  transports,  these  boats  may 
devote  themselves  to  secure  the  safety  of 
the  traffic  between  the  loading  harbors. 

The  departure  of  the  transports  from 
the  various  harbors  must  be  so  regulated 
that  they  sail  in  close  union,  to  assure  a 
safe  voyage  and  a  quick  landing.  The 
loading  commission  must  take  appropri- 
ate means  to  expedite  the  loading  in  those 
harbors  farthest  removed  from  the  central 
assembling  points.  As  a  rule,  the  trans- 
port steamers  would  sail  with  the  battle 
fleet;  but  in  the  English  expedition  to 
South  Africa  and  ours  to  East  Asia,  this 
rule  was  not  followed. 

An  essential  requirement  is  that  the 
transports  put  to  sea  as  soon  as  the  load- 
ing is  complete.  They  cannot  wait  for 
news  of  the  success  of  the  battle  fleet.  A 
certain  risk  is  involved,  but  it  is  not  great, 
for  the  transport  fleet  can  always  turn 
back.  Onfy  an  early  departure  would  in- 
58 


THEORETICAL  VIEWS 

sure  successful,  unexpected  landing.  The 
shorter  the  voyage  the  greater  the  neces- 
sity for  a  surprise  attack. 

In  the  event  of  our  battle  fleet  being 
attacked,  it  does  not  follow  that  the  trans- 
port operations  must  be  abandoned,  for  if 
the  voyage  be  short  an  energetic  continua- 
tion of  the  venture  will  command  a  fair 
prospect  of  success.  Even  the  victor  in  a 
great  naval  battle  might  not  be  able  to 
carry  out  an  attack  against  the  transport 
squadron.  An  individual  hostile  battle 
ship  or  cruiser  would  find  it  difficult  to 
break  into  the  transport  fleet. 

An  important  factor  in  the  sea  voyage, 
perhaps  the  most  important,  is  the 
weather.  For  short  distances,  it  is  pos- 
sible to  a  certain  degree  to  choose  favor- 
able weather  for  the  passage,  with  the  help 
of  scientific  forecasts.  Conditions  might 
be  such  that  a  delay  would  not  harm  the 
operations.  Adverse  weather  conditions 
59 


OPERATIONS  UPON  THE  SEA 

would  more  seriously  affect  long-distance 
transporting,  to  a  degree  that  might  cause 
abandonment.  Our  vessels  must  be  so  im- 
proved as  to  make  them  independent  of 
wind  and  weather,  to  make  certain  the 
speed  of  the  voyage  and  to  permit  the 
establishing  of  a  time  record.  For  the 
time  of  the  passage,  the  highest  speed  of 
the  slowest  boat  is  the  standard,  which 
could  probably  be  increased  by  towing 
with  tugs. 

In  putting  to  sea  all  transport  ships 
must  retain  the  order  of  position  they  are 
to  take  in  the  squadron;  this  order  is  not 
broken  until  after  leaving  the  harbor,  so 
that  the  object  of  the  voyage  is  known 
only  to  the  home  officials.  The  advance 
guard  of  troops  will  sail  in  the  fastest 
ships  so  that  they  can  make  the  unex- 
pected landing.  The  pioneer  and  airship 
divisions  are  placed  with  the  advance 
guard.  The  ships  which  have  artillery 
60 


THEORETICAL  VIEWS 

ride  on  the  flank  of  the  troop  transports, 
Then  follow  the  ships  carrying  supplies. 
The  cable  ship  comes  last.  The  laying  of 
the  cable  gives  a  continuous  communica- 
tion with  the  home  country.  For  exten- 
sive voyages,  preparations  must  be  made 
for  taking  on  coal  on  the  open  sea.  The 
commander-in-chief  of  the  expedition 
corps  should  be  on  a  transport  steamer  so 
that  in  event  of  a  fight  the  transport  fleet 
will  not  be  without  proper  guidance. 

On  long  sea  voyages,  gymnastics,  drill- 
ing and  target  practise  can  be  pursued. 
Ample  daily  exercising  of  the  horses  will 
occupy  the  greater  part  of  the  time  of  the 
cavalry.  For  short  sea  voyages  these  fea- 
tures are  not  so  necessary.  In  general, 
strict  discipline  must  be  exercised  to  over- 
come the  tediousness  of  the  trip. 

While  the  command  of  the  troops  on 
every  transport  is  in  the  oldest  officer,  the 
command  of  the  ship  remains  in  the  hands 
61 


OPERATIONS  UPON  THE  SEA 

of  the  captain,  who  is  inferior  in  rank  to 
the  commander  of  the  troops.  If  this 
captain  has  not  served  in  the  German 
navy,  a  midshipman  may  be  signed  as  a 
coordinate  officer.  It  is  our  policy  to  pro- 
vide every  transport  ship  with  a  naval 
officer. 

LANDING. 

Military  history  shows  that  an  attempt 
to  prevent  a  really  bold  landing  is  never 
successful.  The  defense  must  either  scat- 
ter its  forces  along  the  coast  to  be  pro- 
tected, or  concentrate  its  full  strength  to 
cover  one  point,  while  the  assailant, 
through  the  mobility  of  its  transport,  can 
keep  its  landing  plan  uncertain,  and  under 
the  protection  of  long-range  guns  on  the 
ships  can  throw  more  troops  quickly  on 
the  land  than  the  defense  is  able  to 
concentrate  in  the  same  time.  A  simul- 
taneous   landing   at   different   places   is 

62 


THEORETICAL  VIEWS 

hazardous  if  the  opponent  can  muster  con- 
siderable strength.  An  expedition  is  sel- 
dom so  large  that  disadvantages  arise 
through  landing  at  one  point.  On  the 
other  hand,  it  would  require  a  great  many 
battleships  for  the  protection  of  numerous 
landing  places.  A  division  of  the  forces 
weakens  all  of  them,  and  great  difficulty 
would  be  found  in  uniformly  managing 
the  start  of  the  operations  for  want  of 
time  and  means.  Therefore,  it  is  recom- 
mended, when  the  situation  permits,  to 
select  one  central  place  for  landing. 

For  the  disembarking  a  harbor  is  of 
course  the  most  advantageous ;  less  advan- 
tageous but  always  favorable  is  an  en- 
closed, protected  bay;  the  most  unfavor- 
able is  the  open  coast.  Yet  a  landing  on 
the  open  coast  would  encounter  little  re- 
sistance if  it  is  carried  out  with  great 
speed.  If  the  chosen  landing  place  be 
near  a  bay  or  a  seaport  town,  it  would  be 

63 


OPERATIONS  UPON  THE  SEA 

the  mission  of  the  first  landed  advance 
guard  to  seize  this  port,  to  make  it  possible 
for  the  transport  fleet  to  disembark  the 
mass  of  troops,  horses  and  materials. 
The  occupation  of  a  good  harbor  will 
greatly  hasten  the  unloading,  prevent  a 
hostile  attack  from  the  sea  and  add  greatly 
to  the  ability  of  the  landing  corps  to  carry 
on  the  operations.  If  a  seizure  of  a  port 
is  not  possible,  the  landing  of  the  entire 
expedition  must  take  place  by  means 
of  prepared  disembarking  contrivances. 
Every  transport  must  be  equipped  for 
landing  on  an  open  coast. 

The  best  landing  place  is  a  site  nearest 
the  object  of  the  operations,  which  would 
force  the  opponents  to  a  decision  before 
they  were  thoroughly  prepared.  Clear 
coast  regions  within  range  of  the  ships' 
guns  are  desirable,  as  is  also  quiet,  deep 
water  near  to  the  landing  site. 

64 


THEORETICAL  VIEWS 

It  is  possible  to  land  within  range  of 
important  hostile  garrisons  and  fortifica- 
tions. Russian  landing  maneuvers  have 
demonstrated  the  truth  of  this  statement. 
Fortifications  are  effective  against  land- 
ing enterprises  only  when  sufficient  troops 
are  on  hand  to  defend  the  coast.  If  the 
assailant  is  successful  in  landing  a  detach- 
ment of  troops  out  of  the  range  of  the 
fortifications,  the  latter  would  be  ineffec- 
tive for  defense.  The  best  security, 
however,  for  the  initial  landing  is  its  un- 
expected delivery.  Reconnoitering  of  the 
coast  site  by  boats  sent  beforehand  is  an 
absurdity,  for  the  opponents  immediately 
become  acquainted  with  the  landing  plans 
and  are  given  time  for  preparations  for 
defense.  Of  great  importance  for  rapid, 
well-regulated  landing  is  uniform  man- 
agement through  the  signal  service  of  the 
ships  and  the  telephone  service  on  land, 

65 


OPERATIONS  UPON  THE  SEA 

which  can  be  installed  advantageously. 
In  anchoring  the  ships  must  be  the  correct 
distance  apart,  to  avoid  crowding. 

The  execution  of  the  landing  as  a  rule 
is  as  follows:  The  advance  guard  rides 
ahead,  on  the  last  stretch,  with  its  own 
escort  of  battleships,  and  lands,  if  possi- 
ble, unawares,  usually  at  night.  If  the 
landing  be  on  an  open  coast,  the  mass  of 
troops  which  follow  should  immediately 
throw  up  earthworks.  The  entire  disem- 
barking must  be  made  with  great  speed, 
for  the  quicker  the  landing  is  accom- 
plished the  less  the  danger  of  being  dis- 
turbed. The  most  favorable  time  for 
attacking  the  coast  is  at  dawn,  for  the 
landing  can  take  place  unknown  to  the 
enemy  and  day  be  used  for  disembarking. 
As  the  ships  do  not  carry  a  sufficient  num- 
ber of  patent  boats  for  landing  on  an  open 
coast,  special  flat-bottom  boats  should  be 

66 


THEORETICAL  VIEWS 

prepared  for  unloading  horses  and  heavy 
material.  The  English  employ  collapsi- 
ble boats  for  landing  men,  which  accom- 
modate a  crew  of  fifty,  while  the  Russians 
have  flat-bottom  boats  capable  of  holding 
two  hundred  men,  or  one  complete  cannon. 
It  is  recommended  that  we  be  permitted  to 
try  the  Russian  model,  which  has  been  well 
tested.  Small  power  boats  should  be  em- 
ployed for  tugging,  as  rowing  would  be  a 
waste  of  valuable  time.  To  permit  horses 
to  swim  ashore  is  to  be  condemned,  for  it 
would  cause  confusion  and  delay,  and  we 
know  from  experience  that  a  large  number 
are  sometimes  lost.  The  Americans,  in 
their  landing  in  Cuba,  lost  seven  per  cent, 
of  their  horses.  For  the  landing  of  artil- 
lery and  heavy  materials  small  landing 
bridges  must  be  erected  on  the  beach,  for 
which  prepared  material  is  carried  on  the 
transports.     The  assembling  of  the  troops 

67 


OPERATIONS  UPON  THE  SEA 

must  not  be  permitted  on  the  beach,  for  all 
space  there  must  be  kept  for  the  landing 
of  supplies. 

If  a  landing  near  a  harbor  is  successful, 
the  advance  guard  will  strive  to  take  the 
same  unawares,  to  seize  those  coast  senti- 
nels at  hand  and  to  destroy  the  telegraph 
and  signal  service  along  the  coast.  If  all 
this  is  successful,  the  transport  fleet  will 
be  signaled  to  draw  near.  The  advantage 
is  apparent  in  landing  in  a  large  harbor  or 
bay,  which  affords  the  possibility  of  pro- 
tection from  a  sea  attack,  through  the 
mining  of  the  waters  or  through  the  guard 
of  a  limited  number  of  battleships. 
Earthworks,  equipped  with  cannon  and 
machine  guns,  must  be  thrown  up  for  the 
protection  from  the  land  side. 

The  piers  must  be  distributed  to  make 
sufficient  room  for  disembarking.  The 
existing  plans  for  improvising  landing 
bridges  and  gangways  should  be  extended, 

68 


THEORETICAL  VIEWS 

in  order  to  expedite  the  landing.  The 
piers  and  bridges  will  be  used  for  ships 
carrying  horses,  artillery  and  heavy  mate- 
rials, while  the  infantry  land  by  boats, 
under  the  protection  of  large  guns  on 
shore  or  of  the  escorting  battleships, 
should  the  battle  fleet  maintain  command 
of  the  sea.  The  landed  troops  should  be 
supplied  provisions  for  many  days  so  that 
they  can  begin  operations  independent  of 
the  supply  trains. 

The  time  required  for  landing  is  con- 
siderably less  than  for  loading.  The  nat- 
ural desire  of  the  troops  to  land  quickly 
helps  to  shorten  the  time.  One  writer 
gives  the  following  data:  Lord  Cochran 
landed  18,000  men  on  the  open  coast  of 
America  in  five  hours;  in  the  Crimean 
War  the  English  accomplished  the  disem- 
barking of  45,000  men,  83  guns  and  about 
100  horses  in  less  than  eleven  hours.  The 
French  are  slower  on  account  of  their 

69 


OPERATIONS  UPON  THE  SEA 

handling  of  supply  trains.  The  Russians, 
in  their  landing  maneuvers  in  the  Black 
Sea,  have  landed  a  slow  division  in  eleven 
and  one-half  hours,  where  the  steamers 
had  to  anchor  five  to  six  kilometers  from 
the  coast.  The  marine  writer  Degories 
figures  that  under  average  conditions  it  is 
possible  to  land  25,000  infantry,  1,000 
cavalry  and  60  guns  in  six  hours.  If  the 
landing  can  be  made  in  a  harbor,  this  time 
can  be  essentially  lessened. 

After  the  disembarking  of  the  expedi- 
tion, the  further  task  of  the  transport  fleet 
and  its  escort  of  battleships  depends  on 
the  maritime  strength  of  the  country  at- 
tacked. If  the  assailant  continues  in 
command  of  the  sea,  the  transport  fleet 
can  remain  as  a  floating  base  for  the 
landed  corps  and  can  effect  the  reenforce- 
ment  of  the  expedition.  If  the  assailant 
is  not  in  command  of  the  sea,  then  the 
transport  fleet  must  attempt  to  evade  the 
70 


THEORETICAL  VIEWS 

operations  of  the  hostile  fleet,  by  an  imme- 
diate retreat  to  home  waters. 

OPERATIONS. 

The  operations  of  the  landed  expedition 
corps  on  the  whole  can  be  conducted  ac- 
cording to  the  principles  set  down  by  the 
commanders  of  the  troops,  but  these  prin- 
ciples must  take  into  account  the  particu- 
lar conditions  under  which  the  forces 
operate.  The  well-known  marine  writer, 
Mahan,  emphasizes  the  fact  that  a  landing 
operation  must  be  offensive  to  succeed. 
Military  history  shows  that  after  boldly 
carried  out  landings  at  Abukir  and  Cape 
Breton,  for  example,  the  success  of  the  ex- 
tensive operations  was  impaired,  almost 
lost,  because  of  lack  of  energy  and  rapid- 
ity of  execution  of  offensive  movements. 
The  assembled  strength  must  be  thrown 
forward  on  the  line  of  least  resistance. 
Defensive  strategy  should  be  used  only 
71 


OPERATIONS  UPON  THE  SEA 

when  a  delay  is  necessary  to  receive  ex- 
pected reenf  orcements.  The  primary  aim 
of  the  operations  is  to  dispose  of  hostile 
forces,  within  the  shortest  possible  time 
and  with  the  least  loss  to  ourselves. 

During  the  progress  of  the  operations 
the  country  through  which  the  troops  pass 
can  be  drawn  upon  to  supplement  equip- 
ment and  supplies,  but  the  speed  of  the  ad- 
vance and  the  efficiency  of  the  troops  must 
not  be  decreased  through  extended  raids. 
While  the  distance  to  the  objective  of  the 
invasion  is  generally  not  great,  it  should 
be  our  endeavor  to  be  independent  of  our 
base  of  supplies.  Much  progress  has  been 
made  in  the  methods  of  making  condensed 
foods,  for  man  and  horse,  which  will  help 
to  solve  the  problem  of  provisions.  The 
army  of  invasion  can  also  take  an  impor- 
tant site  in  the  hostile  country  and  utilize 
it  as  a  base  of  operations.  Continuous 
communication  with  the  home  country  is 
72 


THEORETICAL  VIEWS 

therefore  not  absolutely  necessary.  In  a 
densely  populated  and  rich  country  it  is 
easy  to  secure  provisions  and  supplies. 
The  maintenance  of  long  lines  of  com- 
munications is  hazardous  in  that  it  re- 
quires excessive  guard  duty.  When  the 
battle  fleet  has  gained  command  of  the  sea 
it  will  be  in  a  position  to  protect  continu- 
ously the  base  on  the  coast,  and  would  also 
make  it  possible  for  the  corps  of  invasion 
to  select  new  bases.  Sherman's  march  to 
Savannah  in  the  Civil  War  has  shown  the 
practicability  of  this  plan.  After  one  ob- 
jective has  been  attained,  it  should  be  pos- 
sible for  the  expedition  to  reembark  to 
land  at  some  other  point  on  the  coast  for 
further  operations. 

Against  the  enemy's  defenses  we  must 
throw  our  full  strength  and  avoid  enter- 
prises that  involve  a  delay  or  a  weakening 
of  our  forces.  Dearly  purchased  victories 
will  in  the  end  defeat  our  own  aims. 

73 


OPERATIONS  UPON  THE  SEA 

If  the  operations  of  the  troops  are  car- 
ried on  along  the  coast,  or  if  the  objective 
of  the  operations  is  a  harbor  or  a  coast 
fortification,  the  battle  fleet  should  act  in 
unison  with  the  land  forces.  Battleships 
are  superior  to  the  field  artillery,  as  they 
can  be  moved  at  will  and  so  are  hard  to 
put  out  of  action.  Continuous  bombard- 
ment from  the  battleships  would  prove  ef- 
fective aid  for  the  troops. 

It  is  important,  then,  that  the  command 
of  land  and  naval  forces  be  joined  in  a 
commander-in-chief  who  wrould  direct  the 
field  forces  as  well  as  the  naval  forces. 
Small  coast  defenses  of  seaport  cities 
could  not  for  any  length  of  time  withstand 
such  a  combined  attack.  It  is  certain  also 
that  present-day  coast  defenses  could  not 
withstand  an  energetic  attack  from  the 
land  side.  They  are  more  vulnerable  than 
inland  fortresses  because  they  are  open 
to  attack  simultaneously  from  land  and 

74 


THEORETICAL  VIEWS 

water.  However,  if  the  battle  fleet  cannot 
gain  the  command  of  the  sea,  and  must 
retreat  before  the  opposing  forces,  the  op- 
erations of  the  landed  troops  must  be  con- 
ducted wholly  as  a  war  on  land. 

REEMBARKATION. 

A  reembarkation  of  the  expedition 
corps  is  possible  only  when  the  battle  fleet 
is  able  to  prevent  attack  from  the  sea.  In 
the  event  of  defeat  on  land,  reembarka- 
tion is  not  absolutely  impossible,  for  if 
good  order  is  maintained  the  improvised 
defenses  of  the  landing  sites,  with  the  help 
of  the  fleet,  will  sufficiently  delay  the  pur- 
suers. If  the  reembarking  must  take 
place  from  some  other  point,  preparations 
for  its  defense  must  be  made  in  advance. 
When  the  reembarkation  is  done  with  the 
aim  in  view  of  attacking  at  another  place, 
the  rules  as  explained  in  the  chapter  on 
' '  Embarkation ' '  must  be  adhered  to.  For 
75 


OPERATIONS  UPON  THE  SEA 

such  an  operation,  more  time  is  essential, 
and  pressure  of  the  enemy  should  not  be 
permitted  to  interfere  with  its  manage- 
ment. 


76 


APPLICATION 


I.  Consideration  of  Landing  Opera- 
tions Against  Powers  That  Can  Be 
Eeached  Only  by  Sea 

The  recognized  military  complication 
with  England  and  America  affords  an  in- 
teresting example  on  account  of  the  dif- 
ference in  distances  in  which  the  trans- 
porting of  troops  takes  place,  on  account 
of  the  strength  of  the  sea  and  land  fight- 
ing forces  of  the  two  opponents,  and 
lastly  on  account  of  the  difference  in  the 
territorial  extensions  of  the  aforesaid 
countries,  and  on  the  whole  challenges 
various  measures. 

A  conflict  with  England  must  be  fixed 
in  the  eye  of  Germany,  for  the  great  Ger- 
man struggle  for  commerce  represents  to 
England  just  as  great  a  danger  as  the  ad- 
79 


OPERATIONS  UPON  THE  SEA 

vance  of  Russia  against  India.  Begin- 
ning operations  with  a  naval  war  with 
England,  we  could  almost  foresee  the  re- 
sult. 

England  has  brought  about  the  exist- 
ence of  such  a  powerful,  active  navy  that 
we,  with  the  best  defenses  we  have,  would 
hardly  be  able  to  win  a  decisive  victory. 
Only  by  closing  an  alliance  with  Russia 
would  the  strength  of  England  be  injured 
indeed,  but  never  by  a  direct  threat  from 
these  provinces.  But  an  alliance  with 
France  would  in  fact  menace  England. 
The  latter,  however,  through  her  geo- 
graphical location  and  through  her  large 
and  timely  expenditures,  which  every 
combined  operation  demands,  could  make 
possible  by  proper  equipment  a  maritime 
superiority  against  this  alliance. 

England's  weakness  is  in  just  that 
which  forms  our  strength,  namely,  the 
land  army.     The  English  army  responds 

80 


APPLICATION 

to  neither  quantity  nor  quality  of  its  great 
and  powerful  position  in  comparison  with 
the  extent  of  the  land ;  therefore  England, 
from  convictions,  proceeds  so  that  every 
invasion  of  the  land  can  be  prevented  by 
the  fleet.  These  convictions  are  in  no  way 
justified,  for  while  England  in  developing 
a  powerful  sea-fighting  strength  has 
every  day  prepared  for  war,  she  has  not 
had  a  view  of  the  consequences  of  con- 
fronting and  beating  a  really  weaker  sea 
opponent  with  its  fighting  units. 

These  are  the  measures  which  Germany, 
in  case  of  a  threatened  war  with  England, 
must  adopt  and  practise :  Our  endeavors 
must  be  to  engage  the  fleet,  if  possible ;  to 
throw  part  of  our  land  forces  upon  the 
English  coast,  so  that  the  conflict  on  the 
sea  can  be  carried  to  the  enemy's  land, 
where  our  troops  are  already  superior  in 
quality  to  England's,  and  so  that  a  vic- 
tory    for     England's     powerful     naval 

81 


OPERATIONS  UPON  THE  SEA 

strength  could  have  but  the  smallest  in- 
fluence. 

The  army  fighting  strength  of  England 
under  the  commander-in-chief  is  com- 
posed of  the  army  reserve,  the  militia,  the 
volunteers  and  the  yeomanry.  In  the 
event  of  an  unexpected  invasion,  only  the 
commander-in-chief  and  army  reserve  can 
be  considered  to  any  extent,  for  the 
militia  needs  so  much  time  to  assemble 
and  equip  that  they  would  be  in  a  weak 
position  to  assist  the  commander-in-chief 
in  the  first  decisive  battle.  The  volun- 
teers and  yeomanry  cannot  in  so  short  a 
time  be  trained  for  war  or  be  mobilized 
for  action.  Also  their  insignificant  fight- 
ing value  must  be  kept  in  view,  beside 
which  our  well-trained  troops  will  not  let 
them  seem  as  menacing  opponents. 

The  English  army  is  formed  of  three 
army  corps  with  three  divisions  to  each 
corps.     A  third  to  a  half  of  these  corps  is 
82 


APPLICATION 

comprised  of  militia,  so  that  either  it  must 
be  first  completed,  and  then  it  would  be 
too  late  for  cooperation  in  the  first  de- 
cisive battle,  or  it  would  be  so  untrained 
that  it  really  cannot  be  said  to  reach  the 
strength  of  a  division.  Of  two  army 
corps,  two  divisions  and  one  cavalry  bri- 
gade are  in  Ireland,  the  greater  part  of 
which  must  remain  there  to  prevent  the 
undertaking  of  a  German  invasion 
through  Ireland  even  though  it  brought 
about  the  longed-for  freedom. 

The  preparation  for  defense  should  also 
be  considered.  This  might  consist  of  one 
army  corps  with  three  divisions,  or  one 
army  corps  comprised  of  two  divisions, 
with  perhaps  a  cavalry  brigade  made  up 
from  three  army  corps.  Whereas  the 
army  strength  of  an  English  division  is 
about  10,000  men,  a  German  division  car- 
ries 16,000  men,  hence  four  German  di- 
visions and  a  cavalry  division  would  have 

83 


OPERATIONS  UPON  THE  SEA 

a  superiority  over  the  English  army. 
But  we  are  in  a  position  to  set  over  in 
England,  in  the  shortest  time,  six  di- 
visions of  infantry,  or  five  divisions  of  in- 
fantry and  one  cavalry  division. 

How  a  well  regulated  operation  against 
England  is  to  be  conducted  across  the  sea, 
obviously  cannot  be  forecasted  here.  The 
passage  in  moderate  weather  is  a  little 
over  thirty  hours'  ride  from  our  North 
Sea  harbors.  The  English  coast  affords 
extensive  stretches  of  shore  which  are 
suitable  for  landing  troops.  The  land 
contains  such  large  resources  that  the  in- 
vading army  can  procure  a  living  there- 
from. On  the  other  hand,  the  extent  of 
the  island  is  not  so  great  that  the  English 
land  defenses  could  ever  succeed  in  timely 
destroying  a  successful  invading  force. 

It  is  improbable  that  Germany  could 
carry  on  for  very  long  a  well  regulated 
84 


APPLICATION 

war  necessitating  considerable  reenforce- 
ment  of  troops.  The  supplies  would  have 
to  be  furnished  for  the  greater  part  on 
land.  Maintaining  communication  with 
the  home  country  can  therefore  readily  be 
seen  to  be  of  importance. 

It  is  conclusive  that  the  first  aim  of 
every  operation  of  invasion  in  England  is 
their  field  army,  and  the  second  must  be 
London.  It  is  probable  that  these  two 
objectives  would  fall  together,  in  that  the 
field  army,  on  account  of  the  small  value 
of  the  volunteers,  is  needed  for  the  pro- 
tection of  London  fortifications,  so  as  not 
to  leave  the  metropolis  insufficiently  de- 
fended. Powerful  public  opinion  would 
demand  this  for  fear  that  London  would 
fall  into  the  hands  of  the  invaders.  But 
if  London  is  taken  by  the  invading  army 
this  would  still  be  only  one  of  the  many 
war  ports  which  must  be  seized,  to  secure 
85 


OPEKATIONS  UPON  THE  SEA 

a  base  of  supplies  and  for  the  further 
operations  which  have  every  view  to  con- 
cluding the  overthrow  of  England. 

Operations  against  the  United  States 
of  North  America  must  be  entirely  differ- 
ent. With  that  country,  in  particular, 
political  friction,  manifest  in  commer- 
cial aims,  has  not  been  lacking  in  recent 
years,  and  has,  until  now,  been  removed 
chiefly  through  acquiescence  on  our  part. 
However,  as  this  submission  has  its  limit, 
the  question  arises  as  to  what  means  we 
can  develop  to  carry  out  our  purpose  with 
force,  in  order  to  combat  the  encroach- 
ment of  the  United  States  upon  our  in- 
terests. Our  main  factor  here  is  our 
fleet.  Our  battle  fleet  has  every  prospect 
of  victoriously  defeating  the  forces  of  the 
United  States,  widely  dispersed  over  the 
two  oceans.  It  is  certain  that  after  the 
defeat  of  the  United  States  fleet,  the  great 
extension  of  unprotected  coast  line  and 
86 


APPLICATION 

powerful  resources  of  that  country  would 
compel  them  to  make  peace. 

There  is  no  effective  method  to  force 
this  opponent  to  relinquish  its  maritime 
operations,  even  though  there  is  only  a 
trifling  number  of  American  merchant- 
men, except  the  simultaneous  blockading 
with  our  sea  forces  of  American  ports, 
which  can  only  be  taken  with  heavy  losses, 
while  our  fleet  demonstrated  the  actual 
limited  worth  of  the  unpacified  American 
colonies. 

It  must  be  deemed  a  possibility  that  the 
battle  fleet  of  the  United  States  would 
not  risk  an  engagement  at  sea  except  to 
avoid  a  disaster,  but  would  await,  in  its 
fortified  harbors,  a  favorable  opportunity 
to  strike.  It  is  evident,  then,  that  a  naval 
war  against  the  United  States  cannot  be 
carried  on  with  success  without  at  the 
same  time  inaugurating  action  on  land. 
Because  of  the  great  extensions  of  the 
87 


OPERATIONS  UPON  THE  SEA 

United  States  it  would  not  be  satisfactory 
for  the  operation  of  an  invading  army  to 
be  directed  toward  conquering  the  in- 
terior of  the  land.  It  is  almost  a  cer- 
tainty, however,  that  a  victorious  assault 
on  the  Atlantic  coast,  tying  up  the  import- 
ing and  exporting  business  of  the  whole 
country,  would  bring  about  such  an  an- 
noying situation  that  the  government 
would  be  willing  to  treat  for  peace. 

If  the  German  invading  force  were 
equipped  and  ready  for  transporting  the 
moment  the  battle  fleet  is  despatched,  un- 
der average  conditions  these  corps  can 
begin  operations  on  American  soil  within 
at  least  four  weeks.  To  what  extent  we 
will  be  able  to  succeed  has  already  been 
considered. 

The  United  States  at  this  time  is  not  in 

a  position  to  oppose  our  troops  with  an 

army  of  equal  rank.     Its  regular  army 

actually  totals  65,000  men,  of  whom  not 

88 


APPLICATION 

more  than  30,000  are  ready  to  defend  the 
home  country.  Of  these  at  least  10,000 
men  are  required  to  guard  Indian  terri- 
tory and  for  the  garrisoning  of  coast-wise 
fortifications,  so  that  only  a  regular  army 
of  20,000  is  available  for  field  service. 
There  is  also  a  militia  of  100,000  men,  the 
larger  number  of  whom  have  not  been 
trained  since  the  last  war  summons,  and 
they  are  poorly  equipped  with  inferior 
rifles  and  still  more  poorly  drilled. 

If  an  unexpected  invasion  of  the 
United  States  is  prevented  by  the  length 
of  time  for  the  transporting  of  troops, 
and  only  an  unexpected  landing  can  take 
place,  it  must  be  emphasized  that  the 
weakness  and  inexperience  of  their  regu- 
lar army  would  essentially  facilitate  a 
quick  invasion. 

For  the  continued  occupation  of  as 
large  a  territory  as  the  United  States,  if 
they  can  oppose  us  for  any  length  of  time, 

89 


OPERATIONS  UPON  THE  SEA 

an  important  fighting  force  will  be  neces- 
sary, to  protect  the  operating  lines  and 
to  carry  on  a  successful  warfare.  An  in- 
vading operation  will  be  difficult  to  reen- 
force,  in  that  a  second  trip  of  the  trans- 
port fleet  will  be  required,  in  order  to  des- 
patch the  necessary  number  of  troops,  at 
such  a  great  distance. 

It  is  upon  the  whole  questionable 
whether  there  is  anything  to  be  gained  in 
occupying  for  any  length  of  time  so  large 
a  stretch  of  land  as  the  United  States. 
The  fact  that  one  or  two  of  her  provinces 
are  occupied  by  the  invaders  would  not 
alone  move  the  Americans  to  sue  for 
peace.  To  accomplish  this  end  the  in- 
vaders would  have  to  inflict  real  material 
damage  by  injuring  the  whole  country 
through  the  successful  seizure  of  many  of 
the  Atlantic  seaports  in  which  the  threads 
of  the  entire  wealth  of  the  nation  meet. 
It  should  be  so  managed  that  a  line  of 
90 


APPLICATION 

land  operations  would  be  in  close  juncture 
with  the  fleet,  through  which  we  would  be 
in  a  position  to  seize,  within  a  short  time, 
many  of  these  important  and  rich  cities, 
to  interrupt  their  means  of  supply,  dis- 
organize all  governmental  affairs,  assume 
control  of  all  useful  buildings,  confiscate 
all  war  and  transport  supplies,  and  lastly, 
to  impose  heavy  indemnities.  For  enter- 
prises of  this  sort  small  land  forces  would 
answer  our  purpose,  for  it  would  be  un- 
wise for  the  American  garrisons  to  at- 
tempt an  attack. 

Their  excellently  developed  net  of  rail- 
ways will  enable  them  to  concentrate  their 
troops  in  a  relatively  short  time  at  the 
various  recognized  landing  points  on  the 
coast.  But  there  are  many  other  splendid 
landings,  and  it  appears  feasible  for  the 
invading  corps  to  conduct  its  operations 
on  these  points  with  the  cooperation  of 
the  fleet.     The  land  corps  can  either  ad- 

91 


OPERATIONS  UPON  THE  SEA 

vance  aggressively  against  the  concen- 
trated opposing  forces,  or  through  em- 
barking evade  an  attack  and  land  at  a  new 
place. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  Germany  is  the  only 
great  power  which  is  in  a  position  to  con- 
quer the  United  States.  England  could 
of  course  carry  out  a  successful  attack  on 
the  sea,  but  she  would  not  be  prepared  to 
protect  her  Canadian  provinces,  with 
which  the  Americans  could  compensate 
themselves  for  a  total  or  crushing  defeat 
on  the  sea.  None  of  the  other  great 
powers  can  provide  the  necessary  trans- 
port fleet  to  attempt  an  invasion. 


92 


II.  Views  on  Colonial  Expeditions 

All  operations  for  colonial  expeditions 
can  be  undertaken  successfully  because  of 
the  small  forces  necessary  to  transport 
over  the  sea  to  make  war  upon  a  country 
which  does  not  possess  modern  equipment 
and  trained  troops.  Just  such  an  expe- 
dition was  unostentatiously  carried  out  in 
China  before  our  own  eyes. 

The  sending  of  an  expedition  to  East 
Asia  affords  an  interesting  example  of 
what  can  be  done.  Without  resistance  we 
have  set  up  governments  at  a  distance 
from  the  home  country.  It  is  possible 
with  the  aid  of  the  fleet  to  secure  similar 
results.  However,  there  are  many  ob- 
stacles to  be  overcome.  It  is  imperative 
that  in  time  of  peace  we  should  prepare 
93 


OPERATIONS  UPON  THE  SEA 

in  every  possible  way  for  war  in  foreign 
lands  which  have  any  commercial  value 
for  us.  Inasmuch  as  the  German  army 
has  determined  upon  larger  divisions  of 
troops,  the  problems  of  operations  on  the 
distant  sea  falls  to  the  navy.  In  the  fu- 
ture the  conducting  of  such  operations 
will  rest  with  the  General  Staff.  It  will 
be  necessary  to  continue  the  preparations, 
described  fully  in  the  forepart  of  this 
book,  for  the  carrying  out  of  operations 
against  such  countries  as  Asia,  Africa  and 
South  America.  Good  judgment  must  be 
used  in  the  selection  of  methods.  The  ex- 
ecution of  the  first  operations  would  re- 
quire the  constantly  combined  efforts 
of  the  General  Staff  and  the  Admiral 
Staff. 

Our  excellent  knowledge  of  East  Asia 
has  given  us  the  necessary  technical  prep- 
aration in  the  way  of  equipment.     The 
chartering  of  transport  ships  for  service 
94 


APPLICATION 

to  China  should  not  be  difficult  in  conse- 
quence of  the  large  size  of  the  expedi- 
tion. The  expedition  corps  would  re- 
quire eighteen  ships,  material  and  sup- 
plies would  take  five.  The  greater  part  of 
this  number  would  be  amply  supplied  by 
our  two  large  steamship  companies,  the 
North  German  Lloyd  and  the  Hamburg- 
American  Line.  The  charter  of  these 
steamship  companies  provides  for  their 
use  as  transports  if  needed  for  expedi- 
tions of  this  sort.  The  disadvantages  of 
this  arrangement  once  appeared  in  the 
delay  through  a  labor  strike,  when  it  was 
necessary  to  transport  part  of  the  un- 
finished ships  to  Wilhelmshaven.  An- 
other drawback  is  that  not  enough  room 
is  provided  in  these  ships.  On  the  steam- 
ers of  the  Hamburg- American  Line,  for 
example,  only  sixty-five  per  cent,  of  their 
normal  passenger  capacity  can  be  utilized 
for  troops  which  means  at  the  most  an 
95 


OPERATIONS  UPON  THE  SEA 

approximate  displacement  of  three  net 
tons,  so  that  only  one  man  instead  of  two 
can  be  carried.  An  adjustment  should  be 
reached  to  the  end  that  the  entire  freight 
capacity  of  the  steamers  could  be  counted 
upon. 

The  interior  arrangements  of  a  steamer 
to  be  used  for  troop  transport  must  be 
planned  according  to  law.  Fire-extin- 
guishers, life-saving  apparatus  and  other 
necessities  must  be  provided  for;  numer- 
ous tables  and  benches  which  can  be 
drawn  up  to  the  ceiling  should  be  in  the 
troops  rooms,  and  should  also  be  found  up 
on  deck.  Hospital  arrangements  for  two 
and  one-half  per  cent,  of  the  transport 
strength  should  be  provided. 

The  active  troops  of  the  expedition 
corps  are  at  present  drawn  from  volun- 
teers, the  reserve  and  the  militia,  and 
grouped  in  new  formations.  Through  this 
the  home  defenses  may  be  benefited,  but 
96 


APPLICATION 

the  expedition  corps  would  not  be  up  to 
standard,  even  though  the  newly  formed 
troops  would  have  sufficient  time  to  con- 
centrate. It  is  advisable  for  such  an  ex- 
pedition to  employ  active,  well-trained 
soldiers  for  the  main  part,  while  the  bal- 
ance could  be  made  up  of  reserves.  It  is 
also  to  be  recommended  that  in  the  near 
future  we  form  a  fixed  body  of  troops 
trained  for  hospital  service.  Such  a 
formation  would  have  great  intrinsic 
worth. 

A  few  words  should  be  said  about  the 
organizing  of  a  Colonial  army,  which 
would  be  called  upon  to  play  an  essential 
part  in  German  military  operations  over 
the  sea.  It  would  be  of  extraordinary 
value  in  preserving  order  in  our  colonies 
and  would  also  be  of  assistance  in  com- 
mercial aims.  The  Colonial  army  would 
constitute  a  picked  body  of  men,  suitable 
for  service  in  hot  climates  and  uncivilized 

97 


OPERATIONS  UPON  THE  SEA 

countries,  who  would  be  able  to  fight  ef- 
fectively against  colonies  with  which  we 
might  be  at  war. 

There  would  still  remain,  however,  the 
need  of  preparation  of  our  home  forces 
for  colonial  expeditions.  We  are  not  as- 
sured at  present  of  the  assembling  of  the 
necessary  number  of  qualified  troops  with- 
out drawing  on  our  regular  army. 

It  requires  a  good  deal  of  time  to  pro- 
cure the  equipment  for  an  expedition  to 
East  Asia.  Therefore,  contracts  with 
capable  firms  should  be  made,  to  make 
delivery  in  the  shortest  possible  time. 

While  the  equipment  of  the  infantry 
with  up-to-date  weapons  is  easily  accom- 
plished, it  is  noteworthy  that  only  about 
thirty  horses  can  be  loaded  by  the  English 
system.  Some  effort  should  be  made  to 
solve  the  horse  problem.  The  purchasing 
of  horses  in  Australia,  America  and  South 
China  has  ceased,  in  consequence  of  the 
98 


APPLICATION 

knowledge  that  only  a  small  percentage 
can  withstand  the  change  of  climate. 

It  would  be  impossible  to  employ  joint 
cavalry  forces,  due  to  lack  of  mounts. 
It  is  imperative  to  find  the  means  for 
forming  a  mounted  infantry,  for  there 
is  an  insufficient  number  of  advanced 
cavalry  troops  to  meet  an  emergency. 
It  would  be  advantageous  if  large  brigades 
now  idle  could  be  moved  for  operations  in 
Eastern  China.  Past  experience  in  China 
has  emphasized  the  great  importance  of 
cavalry  for  operations  in  large  countries. 

The  losses  in  newly  purchased  horses 
would  be  greater  than  if  we  would  send 
trained  horses  accustomed  to  military 
service.  The  great  loss  in  transporting 
horses  is  no  longer  to  be  feared.  The  ex- 
perience of  the  English  in  transporting 
horses  to  Cape  Town  proves  the  worth 
of  their  loading  system.  And  it  should 
be  pointed  out  that  the  Prussian  horses, 

99 


OPERATIONS  UPON  THE  SEA 

through  their  training,  can  endure  cli- 
matic changes  and  the  hardships  of  sea 
transportation  much  better  than  the 
English  horses. 

The  thirty  horses  on  the  transport  must 
be  well  taken  care  of  to  reach  East  Asia. 
The  ships  should  be  fitted  out  with  this 
aim  in  view.  Accidents  usually  occur  in 
crossing  the  equator.  The  Red  Sea  and 
the  Indian  Ocean  are  especially  difficult 
to  cross.  This  could  be  overcome  by  send- 
ing the  transport  by  way  of  Cape  Town, 
where  a  part  of  the  trip  could  be  made 
south  through  the  Tropic  of  Cancer.  It 
has  been  demonstrated  that  horses  not 
older  than  from  ten  to  sixteen  years  should 
be  selected  for  service  abroad.  No  fear 
need  be  felt  as  to  the  feeding  of  the  horses, 
for  our  horses  are  accustomed  to  little 
corn.  Sometimes  feedings  of  soaked  rice 
with  molasses  added  have  given  favorable 
results. 

100 


APPLICATION 

A  possible  help  for  the  outfitting  of  the 
artillery  would  be  the  purchasing  in  Italy 
of  native  mules  and  loading  them  at  Ge- 
noa. In  English  sea-transporting  these 
animals  have  demonstrated  their  excep- 
tional powers  of  resistance.  They  are 
preferable  to  horses  because  they  can  en- 
dure hardships  better  and  can  more  easily 
be  accustomed  to  conditions  in  East 
Asia. 

While  we  have  a  large  variety  of  artil- 
lery, our  expedition  corps  must  be 
equipped  with  mountain  guns  which  can 
be  carried  by  beasts  of  burden.  This  is 
often  necessary  in  colonial  expeditions. 
Experience  shows  that  it  is  difficult  to 
move  the  heavy  artillery  of  the  field  army 
over  bad  roads,  and  the  large  guns  would 
not  get  very  far.  This  is  true  also  of  the 
steel-boat  bridge  trains.  It  is  surprising 
that  our  collapsible  boats,  universally  ap- 
proved as  superior,  are  not  utilized. 
101 


OPERATIONS  UPON  THE  SEA 

Our  military  arrangements  have  not  in- 
cluded a  suitable  hospital  service,  because 
the  ambulances  are  too  heavy  and  un- 
wieldy. The  French  seem  to  have  been 
afforded  very  good  service  by  the  so-called 
cacolets — saddle  horses  with  pack  saddles 
for  the  sick  and  wounded.  These  are  ex- 
cellent for  use  in  colonial  countries.  A 
light  wagon  model  is  generally  recom- 
mended for  supplies,  for  despite  the  con- 
dition of  the  roads  they  must  be  able  to 
follow  the  troops. 

It  is  a  question  how  the  unfavorable 
conditions  of  communication  with  our 
men-of-war  can  be  improved.  Once  the 
forces  and  supplies  are  in  Bremen  and 
Bremerhaven  no  difficulties  would  be 
found  in  embarking.  For  the  future  a 
central  place  is  recommended  from  which 
the  expedition  corps  can  sail. 

If  thorough  preparations  are  made  the 
loading  of  the  transports  can  be  accom- 
102 


APPLICATION 

plished  in  two  or  three  days;  by  the  old 
method  of  loading  it  took  two  days  for 
each  ship.  To  facilitate  the  work,  the 
loading  should  be  done  simultaneously  on 
both  sides  of  the  steamer.  The  greater 
part  of  the  supplies  can  be  brought  by 
tugs  from  Bremen  to  Bremerhaven.  The 
troops  can  consequently  embark  at  Quai 
in  about  four  hours.  The  vessels,  which 
have  been  arranged  to  utilize  all  available 
space,  can  also  carry  all  accouterments, 
ammunition  and  supplies.  Great  delay 
and  inconvenience  might  be  caused  by  not 
accurately  calculating  the  massive  propor- 
tions of  the  military  shipment.  It  is 
therefore  above  all  argument  that  the 
military  authorities  and  not  the  steam- 
ship company  should  oversee  the  loading 
so  that  it  would  be  done  properly  from  a 
military  standpoint.  Through  a  haphaz- 
ard loading,  the  detached  troops  might  not 
go  in  the  same  boat  with  their  belongings, 
103 


OPERATIONS  UPON  THE  SEA 

and  they  might  not  even  know  where 
their  individual  effects  were  stowed.  Dis- 
embarking would  be  difficult  and  delayed, 
causing  the  forces  to  wait  a  long  time  for 
the  unloading  of  their  guns  and  ammuni- 
tion. 

With  regard  to  the  sea  voyage,  it  is 
very  advantageous  for  us  that  the  sailing 
of  the  joint  fleet  is  not  required.  The 
trip  by  transport  would  take  from  forty- 
two  to  fifty-seven  days.  The  trip  from 
Shanghai  to  Taku  can  be  made  success- 
fully with  the  aid  of  our  battle  fleet.  The 
transports  should  sail  without  artillery 
equipment,  so  that  no  difficulty  would  be 
experienced  in  getting  letters-of-marque ; 
but  if  they  could  have  on  deck  even  a  small 
amount  of  the  guns  which  they  have  on 
board,  they  would  have  nothing  to  fear 
from  privateers  or  auxiliary  cruisers. 
Upon  arrival  at  Taku,  considerable  diffi- 
culties might  be  encountered,  for  it  is  re- 
104 


APPLICATION 

ported  that  it  is  practically  impossible  to 
procure  the  extra  help  needed. 

Considering  a  landing  at  Tsingtau,  it 
should  be  noted  that  there  has  not  been 
provided  a  sufficient  number  of  disem- 
barking boats.  This  situation  proves 
that  under  all  circumstances  the  troop 
transport  must  be  equipped  independently 
to  land  its  troops  and  supplies. 

Experience  has  taught  us  that  a  great 
deal  of  preparation  is  necessary  to  under- 
take colonial  expeditions  and  it  behooves 
us  now  to  lay  a  foundation  for  future  op- 
erations over  the  sea. 


105 


III.  Concluding  Views 

Many  operations  of  our  army,  under 
protection  of  the  fleet,  can  be  conducted 
in  hitherto  unexpected  directions;  many 
commands  which  our  fleet  may  not  be  able 
to  carry  out  alone  can  be  accomplished  by 
the  combination  of  the  land  and  sea  forces. 
Now  if  the  army  across  the  sea  is  able  to 
resist  our  strength,  it  is  necessary  to  pre- 
pare in  advance  to  have  our  battle  fleet  so 
strong  that  it  will  be  in  a  position  to  assist 
materially  in  any  undertaking  of  our 
troops.  From  studies  of  the  strength  of 
our  various  opponents  across  the  sea 
whom  we  must  aim  at,  because  their  neigh- 
boring territory  is  of  great  importance  to 
us,  it  is  plain  that  we  must  enlarge  our 
fleet  to  protect  our  commercial  interests. 
106 


APPLICATION 

It  is  essential  that  the  speed  of  our  battle 
fleets  be  increased.  Not  the  least  impor- 
tant thing  to  realize  is  the  fact  that  as  a 
rule  it  is  impossible  to  undertake  large  op- 
erations across  the  sea,  and  to  carry  them 
out  successfully,  unless  exhaustive  prep- 
arations are  made  during  times  of  peace. 


THE  END 


107 


/ 


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UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA 

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